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Some of the problems raised in the target text for this Forum may be 
alleviated by a consideration of three distinctions about concepts and 
categories. These include the distinctions between: (1) metaphysica1 ver- 
sus epistemological accounts of concepts, (2) the core versus the identifi- 
cation procedure of a concept, and (3) different kinds of concepts. I con- 
sider these distinctions in turn. 
Metaphysical versus Epistemological Accounts of Concepts 
The difference between metaphysical and epistemological approaches to 
concepts is crucial for understanding border disputes between philos- 
ophers and psychologists. This difference is discussed at length in the 
exchange between Rey 1983, 1985, a philosopher, and Smith, Medin, and 
Rips 1984, psychologists all, and what follows borrows heavily from that 
exchange. Metaphysics deal with how the world is (which is investigated 
by science), while epistemology deals with how w e  know,  believe, infer how 
the zuorld is (Rey 1983). Thus, a metaphysical categorization considers what 
makes an entity an instance of a particular kind, whereas an epistomolog- 
ical categorization considers how an agent decides whether the entity is 
of a particular kind. We can illustrate with the concept gold (italics indicate 
concepts). A metaphysical categorization of an object with respect to gold 
would take atomic structure to be the ultimate criterion-because that 
is the best guess of the relevant science as to what the ultimate criterion 
is-whereas an epistemological categorization of an object with respect to 
gold might consider the object’s color, value, and common usage. 
It takes a bit more work to connect this distinction to the issues raised 
in the target text. Obviously, psychology deals with epistemological 
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accounts, but why should it care about a metaphysical account of concepts? 
The reason is that, according to well-known arguments of Kripke (e.g. 1972) 
and Putnam (e.g. 1975), only a metaphysical account provides ‘identity’ 
conditions for concepts, i.e. conditions for deciding whether two concepts 
are the same or different. Thus, if you use an object’s color and value to 
categorize it as gold, where I consider its customary use and where it is 
mined, we would not want to conclude that we have different concepts of 
gold. For, presumably, both of us recognize that the properties we are 
currently using to identify gold are not necessarily tied to gold. To get true 
identity conditions, we must move to the metaphysical level, and there 
the relevant science tells us that the best guess of an identity condition 
for gold is that i t  is a chemical element with atomic number 79; if this 
guess turns out to be right, you and I are both talking about go1d only if 
we are both talking about the stuff with atomic number 79. 
The above is a rough version of the argument that Rey 1983 advances 
against a purely psychological (i.e. epistemological) approach to concepts. 
I think this argument provides a context in which to understand some of 
the philosophical complaints voiced in the target text, claims like ‘ . . . con- 
cepts fall outside the domain of psychological processes’, and ’The funda- 
mental point is that grasp of a concept is a normative, rather than a 
descriptive, matter’. Such complaints may reduce to the claim that one 
must go outside of psychology to find true identity conditions of concepts, 
which means that psychology cannot supply a complete theory of concepts. 
Even if the above argument is accepted at face value, i t  does not spell 
the end to a psychological (epistemological) study of concepts. As argued 
elsewhere (Smith et R I .  1984), although psychology may not be able to 
supply a complete theory of concepts, i t  may be able to supply enough to 
account for many aspects of concepts and their use. For the notion of 
sameness of concepts, which is what psychologists presumably are unable 
to offer, may not be essential for elucidating many aspects of concept use. 
The ability of you and I to communicate about gold, for example, may not 
require that we have the same concepts, but rather only that we have 
similar mental contents, where the mental contents include properties that 
we use to identify gold as well as more diagnostic properties that we 
believe to be true of gold (such as, that there’s something inside of gold 
that makes it look and act the way it does). More generally, similar mental 
contents may be sufficient to support a notion of cornmunality of concepts, 
and communality may be all that is needed to account for important aspects 
of communication. So psychologists can accept the philosophers claims 
about the limits of a purely epistemological approach to concepts, yet still 
carve out a fruitful domain of study. 
Core versus Identification Procedure 
Within a psychological approach to concepts, one needs to distinguish two 
components of a concept: (1) the identification procedure, which consists of 
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properties that are perceptually salient and easy to compute, though by 
no means perfectly diagnostic of concept membership; and (2) the core, 
which consists of properties that are more diagnostic of concept member- 
ship but that tend to be somewhat hidden and less accessible for rapid 
categorization (Smith and Medin 1981; Smith et  al. 1984). I can illustrate 
with the concept bird. Identification properties might include flies, sings, 
perches in trees, and eats insects, whereas core properties might include 
having bird genes, or if you are not that sophisticated, having parents 
who were birds. Clearly, a property like flies is more salient than one like 
having bird genes, whereas the latter is the more diagnostic than the 
former. 
This distinction has straightforward implications for some of the issues 
raised in the target text. The characterization of the so-called ‘recognitional’ 
approach to concepts (‘Having the concept of a dog .  . . is principally a 
matter of being able to sort prototypical dogs from clear examples of non- 
dogs‘) deals only with identification procedures and ignores cores. As a 
consequence, the recognitional approach is left wide-open to the linguists 
criticism that ‘ . . . an account in terms of prototypes must be able to allow 
for the fact that someone who has a concept of a grandfather knows that 
someone who is the father of a parent is a grandfather, whether he fits the 
prototype or not’. This criticism dissolves in the face of the identification 
procedure-core distinction: an account in terms of prototypes (i.e. identifi- 
cation procedures) need not worry about matters like the ’father of a parent 
is a grandfather’ because that is the business of cores. Thus, the concept 
grandfather presumably contains identification properties like older, grey 
haired and kindly, as well as the core property of father of a parent; the 
former properties permit one to sort prototypical grandfathers from clear 
examples of non-grandfathers, whereas the latter property allows one to 
declare a father-of-a-parent a grandfather. 
Different Kinds of Concepts 
Sometimes the Forum discussion seems to presuppose that, psychologically 
speaking, all concepts are of the same sort. In contrast, a number of 
psychologists and linguists are currently arguing that there are qualitat- 
ively different kinds of concepts (e.g. Lakoff 1987; Smith 1989). 
The most obvious difference in kind is that between ’classical‘ and 
‘prototype’ concepts. Classical concepts are those whose core consists of a 
definition, i.e. a set of singly necessary and jointly sufficient properties. A 
standard example is bachelor, whose defining properties include adult, 
male, and unmarried. In contrast, the cores of prototype concepts do not 
consist of definitions, but rather of vague scientific-like beliefs (e.g. the 
core of bird includes bird-genes, whatever that is), and possibly a pointer 
to experts who could amplify and elaborate these beliefs (as suggested by 
Putnam 1975). Classical concepts are frequently parts of formal systems 
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that are person-made (like the kinship system), whereas prototype concepts 
are frequently part of people’s general knowledge about natural kinds and 
artifacts. 
The Forum discussion happens upon this potential distinction but then 
dismisses it with the offhand remark that ‘ .  . . there are almost no 
concepts-apart from bachelor-for which definitions are available’. This 
is simply not the case. Classical concepts abound in formal systems that 
many people have knowledge about: consider square, circle, etc. from the 
system of geometry; odd number, even number, etc. from various systems 
of mathematics; robber, felon, etc. from the legal system; uncle, nephew, 
etc. from the kinship system; island, volcano, etc. from the geological 
system; and so on. In addition, many social concepts may have a classical 
structure. Consider concepts about national origin, such as German and 
Italian, where the core seems to come down to a few defining properties 
(e.g. either born in Germany or adopted citizenship in Germany). A similar 
story may hold for concepts of race (e.g. Black, Whi te ) ,  gender (maze, female), 
and profession (e.g. lawyer,  baker). These social concepts are among the 
most widely used in categorizing other people. So there are plenty of cases 
of classical concepts, certainly enough to take seriously the idea that they 
constitute an important type of concept. 
There seem to be needs to distinguish other kinds of concepts as well. 
Within the set of prototype concepts, there is some evidence that natural- 
kind concepts differ in important ways from artifact concepts (e.g. Gelman 
1987; Malt 1985). And among social concepts, there is evidence that trait 
concepts like aggressive are different in kind from person concepts like 
aggressive person (Anderson and Klatzky, 1987). Any claims about a theory 
of concepts therefore needs to keep in mind just what  kind concepts the 
theory is intended to apply to. 
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